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The growing radical movements in Tsarist Russia at the turn of the 
century produced many international revolutionaries who aroused ten- 
sion and fear not only in their own country, but also in other countries 
where they worked for the revolution in Russia. At the turn of the cen- 
tury Finland was a part of the Russian empire, having been taken from 
Sweden in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Particularly during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the Russian Grand 
Duchy of Finland was heavily oppressed by the Tsarist government, and 
its special rights as a part of the empire were being restricted. 
Santeri Nuorteva (originally Alexander Nyberg, and in his later years 
in The Soviet Union Alexander Fedorovitch Nuorteva) was a product of 
these circumstances. Born in 1881 in Viipuri, his father was of Finnish- 
Swedish and his mother of Russian Jewish background. Nuorteva's in- 
ternational background had an effect on his future life, particularly on 
his linguistic capabilities (it is said that in his late years Nuorteva could 
speak more than ten languages) and his contacts with Russia. In this ar- 
ticle special attention is paid to Santeri Nuorteva's important role in the 
development of the early connections between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, or Soviet Russia, as it was called during the years follow- 
ing the October revolution.' The article is based mainly on archival and 
documentary sources from Finland, the United States and the Soviet 
Union. A special difficulty always exists when archival sources are used 
to study international radicals like Nuorteva: many sources have been 
destroyed deliberately. Many of the international revolutionaries' activi- 
ties were illegal and therefore undocumented. Moreover, in many cases 
government information contains numerous errors that derive from a 
- 
number of  source^.^ 
Historians have shown little interest in Nuorteva's career, perhaps be- 
cause of the elusiveness of a restless life marked by frequent moves from 
one country to another. Apart from some biographies loaded with mis- 
understandings and errors, there are no scholarly studies. Although 
many studies on international affairs or radical movements have paid 
some attention to his activities, work on Santeri Nuorteva has proved to 
be pioneering research on a notable and colourful indi~idual.~ 
Nuorteva came from a family that had made a distinguished contri- 
bution to the cultural life of Finland. At the beginning of the century 
Nuorteva joined the Social-Democratic movement and soon became a 
leading member of the Party and a member of Parliament. The period 
was one of great political unrest with recurring dissolutions of Parlia- 
ment that resulted from the rapidly increasing pressure of Russia on 
Finland. In the year 1909 Nuorteva was sentenced to six months in pris- 
on for lese-majesty. This was due to the publication of writings critical 
of the Tsar in a newspaper which he edited. When in the course of 191 1 
it seemed clear that he could expect a further sentence for a similar 
crime, Nuorteva found it prudent to leave for the United States, as 
many other Finnish socialists had done. 
In the United States, Santeri Nuorteva quickly established himself as 
one of the leaders of the Finnish-American socialists and their very ac- 
tive organization Yhdysvaltain Suomaluinen Soszalistzjarjesto (Finnish 
Socialist Federation, FSF). He worked there as an editor of the Finnish-- 
language workingmen's journals Toven' (Comrade), Raivaaja (Pioneer) 
and Sakenia (Sparks), and as an active functionary and lecturer of the 
Finnish Socialist Federation. Thanks to his linguistic capabilities and to 
the fact that he was a very representative figure - he had experienced 
after all a significant political career in Finland - Nuorteva also 
became the representative of the Finnish-American socialists in their 
dealings with the Socialist Party of America. But it was not until the be- 
ginning of 1918 that Nuorteva acquired real notoriety when he was 
asked by Yrjo Sirola of the Finnish Red revolutionary government to be 
their representative in the United States. 
Nuorteva agreed and became particularly active in propaganda 
work, circulating articles which described the Finnish situation to 
American organizations and which reached even people in the govern- 
ment. So successful was he in his task that he managed to embarrass the 
representatives of the official )>White(< Finnish government by getting 
their accounts in New York banks frozen. 
The main argument employed by Nuorteva was that White Finland 
was an ally of Germany and a defender of German interests. Since the 
United States had already in the spring of 1917 joined the Allies in the 
war against the central Powers, Nuorteva did not find it difficult to get 
public opinion on his side. He sent propaganda material and many let- 
ters to representatives of the United States government in Washington, 
even to President Woodrow Wilson. Information was continuously sent 
to large newspapers like the New York Times, the New York Tribune, 
the Evening Post and many othem4 
From the beginning, Nuorteva linked the Finnish and Russian revo- 
lutions in his propaganda. When he and his Finnish Information Bu- 
reau, which he established in New York on March 30, 1918, issued pro- 
paganda for the Finnish revolutionary government, they included on 
,their own initiative propaganda for the Russian Bolshevik cause. This 
became apparent in the numerous meetings organized by Nuorteva. 
For example, in May 1918 in New York's Carnegie Hall, a mass meeting 
with about 3000 participants - most of them Americans - was held. 
In the meeting, in addition to Santeri Nuorteva, certain leading Ameri- 
can radicals spoke, such as the prominent socialist Morris Hillquit, who 
also happened to be the legal adviser of Nuorteva's Finnish Information 
Bureau. John Reed, the well-known leftist writer, also delivered a 
speech. The speakers demanded that the United States government re- 
cognize both the Russian and Finnish revolutionary governmenk5 
As the Red revolution in Finland lost momentum during the spring 
of 1918 and was finally defeated in May of 1918, Nuorteva's role in the 
United States increasingly became that of a defender of Soviet Russia. 
He was in contact with various organizations and individuals syrnpa- 
thetic to the Bolsheviks, and by working with them he engaged in pro- 
paganda activity for the Soviet Russian cause. From the reports and 
reminiscences of Nuorteva, however, it is clear that the Bolshevik gov- 
ernment did not give him direct orders or financial support at this stage. 
He initiated his activities him~elf .~ This is why Nuorteva's work in the 
United States in 1918 has to be regarded as one of the early steps toward 
the establishment of Soviet Russia's delegation in the United States. This 
becomes apparent in, for example, the requests made by United States 
officials to Nuorteva for information about the situation in Russia rath- 
er than Fir~land.~ The conclusion regarding the importance of Santeri 
' Nuorteva's activities, drawn by the Lusk Committee of New York State, 
which studied radical activities, appears to be accurate: the Finnish and 
Russian revolutions were related. When the Reds took power in Fin- 
land, the possibilities for the Bolsheviks in the United States to make 
propaganda for their cause were immediately enhan~ed .~  
When we examine Santeri Nuorteva's ideological development, we 
find that even if he was a radical socialist, in Finland he had displayed 
certain features which connect him with the revisionists. He emphasized 
that workers should use all possibilities, including cooperation with the 
bourgeois groups, to improve the lot of the lower classes or in the fight 
against Tsarist pressure. In addition, while in the United States he was 
attacked by the extreme radicals of the Finnish Socialist Federation, by 
those who were attached to the Industrial Workers of the World, the 
IWW. They accused him of being too cooperative with the ,bourgeoi- 
sie(< and the ))old fashioned(( American Federation of Labor, the AFofL. 
The fact is that Nuorteva for a short period worked as an organizer for 
the Shingle Weavers' Union on the West Coast (member of the AFofL). 
He also incurred the wrath of the Finnish IWW-supporters when he 
strongly condemned the unionism presented by the IWW. 
From 1912 to 1917 Nuorteva can be defined as a social democrat. 
However, after the 1917 October revolution he increasingly turned to 
the left. He finally broke with the Social Democrats over his admiration 
for the Russian revolution, his work for Red Finland in the United 
States, and his willingness to propagandize for the Bolsheviks. Another 
important factor which separated Nuorteva from Finnish-American 
and American Social Democrats was his attitude towards the Commu- 
nist International, or the Comintem, which was formed in Moscow in 
the spring of 1919. The Social Democrats were not willing to follow the 
orders issued by the Comintern, whereas the Communists were. 
When the American communist movement was born during the 
years after the October revolution. Finnish-Americans were not at the 
forefront of the new movement. The Finnish Socialist Federation with 
its more than 10.000 members was very cautious in their relations with 
the different factions within American socialism. Government pressure 
also made the Finns cautious. 
When American socialists formed the Communist Party of America 
and the Communist Labor Party in the fall of 1919, the FSF did not go 
along with either faction. The growing anti-radical government forced 
the communist parties underground. With the reduced tensions that 
accompanied the legalization of the communist party, the Workers Par- 
ty of America was created in 1921, and the Finns became the largest na- 
tionality group in it. In the early 1920's the radical Finns - the FSF had 
been split in the process - with more than 6000 members constituted 
more than 40% of the membership of the Workers Party, which totaled 
about 12-15000 membemg 
It seems that Santeri Nuorteva himself was not very actively involved 
in the ideological battles of these years - at least there is not much evi- 
dence of this. He was above all the propagandist of the Bolsheviks, en- 
gaged in diplomatic and ,commercial work for the Soviets. Nuorteva was 
the person who defended Soviet Russia primarily because it was the first 
"workers' states." 
It is said that Nuorteva was one of the most important figures in the 
formation of the American communist movement.1° But even in his 
short autobiography, Nuorteva does not say much about his role in the 
rising American communist movement, beyond mentioning he worked 
actively for the radical line in the Finnish Socialist Federation." Nuorte- 
va's reputation as a radical and a communist has to be seen as a conse- 
quence of the work he did in the Finnish Information Bureau and for 
, the Bolshevik government. In this connection he even attracted the at- 
tention of the Military Intelligence. They sent agents to follow him and / 
to report on his activities. His name was mentioned in connection with 
Morris Hillquit, John Reed, and leftist editors like Eaikrnonn McAlpine, 
Gregory Weinstein and Louis C. Fraina. There are a number of very 
dramatic reports accusing him of importing revolution into the United 
i) States, of being ))an agitator of the extreme type(( and ,in no way a 
friend to the best interestscc of the United States.12 In another report 
from August 30, 1918, the Military Intelligence agent Julius Wulpert 
wrote the following from the Socialist Party meeting in Chicago:13 
. . . while there was nothing anti-American in his speech, hls [Santeri Nuorteva] care in 
choosing his words was noticeable and several questions propounded to him on American di- 
plomacy or government he refused to answer or give an opinion . . . 
Subject is a socialist propagandist and a shrewd diplomat. He has called on Mr. Miles of the 
State Department in Washington, and asked for the assistance of this government, pledging an 
anti-German policy on behalf of the Red Guard of whom he claims to be accredited agent . . . 
The summary of the case of Santeri Nuorteva by the Military ntelli- L gence, a total of more than 60 pages, contains much detailed in a- 
tion, and points to Nuorteva as one of the central figures in the forma- 
tion of the American communist parties in 1919. It also claims that 
Nuorteva and Martens, who was named the representative of Soviet 
Russia in the United States in 1919, had used large amounts of money 
to import revolution into America. According to the summary Santeri 
Nuorteva was nominated an honorary member of the American Com- 
munist Labor Party together with some American radicals like Eugene 
V. Debs.14 
The reports and letters which arrived at the Military Intelligence offi- 
ces were often a combination of facts and imagination. Much erroneous 
information was received from the rightist Finnish-Americans or right- 
wing socialists who were the ,enemies(( of the communists and the radi- 
cals. They often wanted to discredit Nuorteva and the radical line of the 
Finnish-American  socialist^.'^ 
More suspicions were aroused towards Nuorteva when his work for 
Soviet Russia was made official. Some attempts to obtain recognition 
for Soviet Russia had been made already at the end of 1917, with the 
establishment of an organization named Friends of the Russian Revolu- 
tion, also known as the Friends of New Russia. Its purpose was to pro- 
mote the peace conditions presented by the Bolsheviks. At the begin- 
ning of 1918, the American Bolshevik Bureau of Information was foun- 
ded, which in a sense was the predecessor of Martens' bureau. Its foun- 
ders were purely ))Americancc radicals, willing to help stabilize the young 
Soviet state.16 
The name of Santeri Nuorteva does not occur in connection with the 
above mentioned organizations. Instead, he was one of the leaders of 
the Soviet Russian Recognition League, established in the middle of 
1918. Its president was Alexander Trachtenberg, a well known emi- 
grant and leftist. Nuorteva himself claims to have established the 
League together with Gregory Weinstein, Juri Lomonossow and other 
radicals working in Arneri~a. '~ 
In addition, before the creation of Martens' office, certain other or- 
ganizations promoting ties with Soviet Russia were operating in the 
United States. One of them was the Friends of Soviet Russia, which 
aimed at getting material help for Russia. 
More or less unofficially, Nuorteva used the Finnish Information Bu- 
reau to work for Soviet Russia, as we have noted. In his autobiography 
Nuorteva states that he and Gregory Weinstein established the new 
Soviet Russian Information Bureau while working for the Finnish Infor- 
mation Bureau. There they argued against intervention in Russia and 
for the recognition of the Soviet state.18 It seems at times difficult to de- 
termine which of the various organizations was named Martens' bureau 
at the beginning of 1919, or was the Soviet Russian Information Bureau 
a new one, without a predecessor? Perhaps the last alternative is the 
right one. Thus, we may suppose that Nuorteva's and other radicals' 
work and organizations formed the basis on which Martens' bureau was 
built. For example, the Finnish Information Bureau was gradually clos- 
ing its doors, and finally its staff moved to the Soviet Russian Informa- 
tion Bureau and a new address. 
Nuorteva's role in the formation of the Soviet Bureau is not clear. He 
appears to have been quite an important figure in the process, even if 
Martens' role is dominant in Soviet historiography. This is apparent in 
the works of Tarle and Evgen'ev and Sapik.lg 
However, it must be emphasized that the developments before the 
foundation of the Soviet Russian Information Bureau include a great 
deal of voluntary work. Nuorteva and other persons worked voluntarily 
for Soviet Russia. They financed their activities from donations, lecture 
fees or rewards, and payments for ,other kinds of jobs.cPO During this 
voluntary phase Santeri Nuorteva had a very important role in the pro- 
paganda work. This is reflected in e.g. the words of Theodore Draper, 
who says that Nuorteva was the most prominent spokesman for the Bol- 
sheviks in the United States before the foundation of the Soviet 
b u r e a ~ . ~ '  
The Bolsheviks appear to have had difficulties in establishing rela- 
tions with the Americans. Actually, Maxin Litvinov was in June 1918 
nominated as their plenipotentiary in the United States. He did not ar- 
rive in the c o u n t r y , b  at the beginning of 1919 the Bolshevik regime 
nominated Ludvig C.A.K. Martens as their representative and as the 
head of the new Soviet Russian Information Bureau. He presented his 
credentials in Washington on March 18, 1919, in a document which 
was also signed by Santero Nuorteva, the secretary of his bureau. At- 
tached was a long description of the conditions in Russia, signed by 
Martens and N u o r t e ~ a . ~ ~  Apparently it was written by the latter. 
The nomination of Martens actually marked the stabilization of the 
work by Nuorteva and others. Martens (1875-1948) was an old revolu- 
tionary who had come to America in 1916. He had worked as the vice- 
chairman of Weinberg & Posner, a machinery firm, when he was called 
to the service of the Bolshevik regime. Martens continued his activities 
in the bureau until the beginning of 1921, when he returned to Russia 
and the activities of the bureau were stopped. In December 1920 Mar- 
tens' deportation was ordered but the actual expulsion was not carried 
out because of the desire not to bring the existing American-Soviet rela- 
tions to a crisis.2s The United States government did not actually recog- 
nize the Bolshevik government until 19%. 
The office of the Soviet Russian Information Bureau was located in 
New York at the World Tower Building, 110 W.40 Street. Placing the 
office in New York City is proof, according to Anthony C. Sutton, that 
it was intended more for the creation of commercial than diplomatic re- 
lations with the United s t a t e ~ . ~ ~  The climate for the work of the bureau 
\ 
was not good. Because of the tension in the country, the fear of Bolshe- 
viks, radicals, aliens, etc., its activities were closely monitored. The lead- 
ing men of the bureau, Martens and Nuorteva, were called to testify be- 
fore the Senate subcommittee that was investigating radical activities in 
the United States. In 1919 the office was raided and its materials con- 
fiscated by the Lusk Committee of the State of New York. 
Anyway, the Soviet Bureau at the beginning of 1919 consisted of al- 
most forty persons, although many of them seem to have been only 
nominally associated. The head was Martens; the nchief of the bureaucc 
was listed as Gregory Weinstein and the secretary of the bureau as San- 
ten Nuorteva. Nuorteva also had a personal secretary, Dorotha Keen, 
who had worked in the Finnish Information Bureau. According to the 
lists preserved from the bureau, it was organized into commercial, tech- 
nical, medical, economical-statistical, editorial, legal and information 
departments. Each of these had several workers. Included among the 
personnel were, e.g., the above mentioned lawyer and socialist leader 
Morris Hillquit as well as the well known economist Isaac A. Hourwich. 
Nuorteva was ranked second to Martens. 
Nuorteva's work consisted mostly of giving information to the Ameri- 
can press and government officials. A good account of his activities is 
given in the pages of the Weekly Bulletin of the Bureau of Information 
of Soviet Russia, which appeared in New York from the spring of 191 9. 
It was soon followed by a periodical called Soviet Russia. Both of these 
included descriptions of the diplomatic efforts of the Bolsheviks, docu- 
ments from Soviet Russia, descriptions of the life of ordinary people in 
Russia, and facts about commercial relations between Soviet Russia and 
the United States. 
In addition to the information services, Nuorteva also took care of the 
diplomatic work of the bureau. On several occasions he was even called 
the ,head of the diplomatic department.cF5 One of his most important 
and peculiar attempts in this field was the effort to help the Paris peace 
conference of 1919 establish a contact with Lenin and his government. 
There was the problem in Paris of how to deal with intervention in Rus- 
sia, as well as how to deal with the warring groups there. Woodrow Wil- 
son made an effort to bring the opposing factions to the negotiation tab- 
le in Prinkipo, on the Sea of Marmara. He failed, as only the Bolsheviks 
agreed to come .26 
Nuorteva appears to have had a role in this process - or at least he 
tried to have one. According to the papers preserved by the Department 
of State, Nuorteva contacted the legal adviser of the large Hearst com- 
pany, Mr. Granville S. MacFarland, and with his help was able to meet 
the under secretary of state, Frank Polk. Nuorteva suggested that he 
send a wire to Lenin through American officials in Paris, to make sure 
that the Bolsheviks would send delegates to the proposed Prinkipo con- 
ference. It is not clear if Nuorteva's activities had any real effect. Accor- 
ding to Anthony C. Sutton, Nuorteva's wire was not sent to L e r ~ i n . ~ ~  But 
perhaps Nuorteva still played a role in the process, since the Bolsheviks 
did agree to come to Prinkipo. 
Efforts to promote commercial relations between Soviet Russia and 
the United States appear to have been of great importance for the So- 
viet Russian Information Bureau. Martens himself stated that the pro- 
m o t w o f  commercial relations was the primary concern of the 
bureamZ8 This strategy was based on a realistic analysis of attitudes in 
the United States: it was clearly very difficult for the Bolshevik regime to 
gain recognition by the United States government. It was easier to de- 
velop commercial contacts, and by starting there, it might be possible to 
work towards diplomatic recognition. 
Trade relations with foreign countries in the Western World were of 
primary importance for the Soviets. After the October revolution it was 
important to stabilize and stimulate economic life in Russia. The Soviets 
had suffered enormous losses both in the World War and in the chaos 
of Civil War and foreign intervention. Practically everything was need- 
ed. 
According to the studies by Anthony C. Sutton, American business 
circles had been in contact with the Russian revolutionaries even before 
the actual revolution. Later, there were several companies which traded 
extensively and made agreements with Soviet Russian enterprises - for 
example, in 1919 for more than $20 million worth of machinery, food- 
stuffs, clothes etc .29 
Santeri Nuorteva, unlike Martens, hardly had any major commercial 
experience, but he engaged in business relations and referred to himself 
as the ))purchasing directorcc of Soviet Russia. In the materials confis- 
cated by the Lusk Committee there is correspondence from the Soviet 
Russian Bureau of Information to about one thousand American busi- 
ness enterprises. Nuorteva also claimed to have been in contact with 
some 500 b~sinessmen.~~ According to Soviet historian Leo Suni, Mar- 
tens and Nuorteva were an object of great interest for the capitalist 
business world. This was quite natural since western businessmen saw 
great possibilities in the reopening of the Russian market.31 
As it is well known, the Russian revolutionaries tried to finance their 
activities abroad using funds accumulated by the Tsarist regime. It had 
made big deposits in foreign banks and now the Bolshevik government 
tried to confiscate them by claiming to be the legal government of Rus- 
sia. The Bolsheviks also obtained cash by selling off the valuables of the 
Tsar and his family which had fallen into their hands during the course 
of the revolution. Therefore, even Martens' and Nourteva's bureau in 
the United States appears to have had quite a lot of money at their dis- 
posal. If we can believe the announcement made by Martens in March 
1919, the Bolsheviks had decided to use $200 million which were depos- 
ited in the banks of Western Europe and the United States ))during the 
first stages of commercial relationscc with the Western countries.32 From 
the beginning of 1920 Russian money and valuables were transported 
via Sweden and Norway to the West.% The large amounts Martens 
mentioned are also understandable as sums to lure the American public 
and the business world. 
Even Santeri Nuorteva appears to have received money through these 
channels, as indicated by the infamous case of Carl Sandburg, about 
which a large amount of correspondence between the United States 
government officials and Nuorteva has been preserved. Carl Sandburg 
was known for his socialist sympathies and when he returned from Oslo 
to America at the end of 1918 he was given a cheque of $10,000 to be 
given to Nuorteva. However, at the port of New York he was thoroughly 
searched and the cheque c~nfiscated.~~ Nuorteva later tried to recover 
the money, but in vain. 
Not all Bolshevik sympathizers in the United States approved of the 
commercial role of the Soviet Russian Information Bureau. This is why 
Martens and Nuorteva appear to have had some difficulties with them, 
and this is why even the Comintern had to defend the Soviet Bureau's 
The anti-radical sentiments in America also caused difficulties 
like the raid of the bureau in 1919 and the investigations of the bureau's 
activities. This is why Santeri Nuorteva had to leave the country in the 
summer of 1920 and Martens followed in early 1921. 
Furnished with a diplomatic passport by Ludvig Martens, Nuorteva 
reached Canada in June 1920. There his task was to contact business- 
men who had shown a keen interest in the great markets that were now 
opening up in Soviet Russia. But the Red Scare was having its effect in 
Canada, too, and questions began to be raised in Parliament about the 
way in which Canadian-Soviet trade was being handled, and about 
Nugrteva. The latter had now, however, found it wiser to leave for Eng- ' 
land - which was probably the ultimate destination he had had in 
mind when he departed from the United States.36 
Towards the end of June 1920 this ))Red Diplomatcc arrived in Eng- 
land where he intended to work for the Soviet Russian commercial 
agency in London. The head of this agency was the old Bolshevik Leo- 
nid Krasin, but Nuorteva only managed to work for him for a very 
brief period. Scotland Yard had kept a close watch on Nuorteva's activi- 
ties, and it was alleged that he established contacts with English left- 
wing radicals. He was arrested and his deportation was planned; partic- 
ularly in view of the information received from the United States, he 
was regarded as extremely dangerous. The arrest of Nuorteva caused a 
great sensation in England, and questions were put to the Government 
in Parliament about his fate and the reasons for his arrest. The news 
spread quickly to Finland and Soviet Russia. A sharply-worded demand 
for Nuorteva's release was sent by the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Af- 
fairs, Chicherin. The British now had to consider where to deport him. 
They decided on Soviet Russia, a country to which Nuorteva himself 
wanted to go. He did not want to be returned to Finland, fearing that 
he would be arrested there, and the United States refused absolutely to 
allow him to return. The actual deportation was a farce. The British 
despatched Nuorteva to Soviet Russia by way of Denmark, but the 
Danes refused to let him into the country, and he was returned to Eng- 
land. This provoked further public controversy, and the next step was 
to send him on a British warship to Tallin, where he arrived at the end 
of July 1920. The British Government and the Admiralty subsequently 
became the butt of criticism for having devised so expensive a solution. 
The conclusion has to be drawn that the British wanted to get rid of 
Nuorteva at whatever cost. Their fear of him did not lack foundation, 
for in the United States he had shown himself to be a most effective pro- 
pagandist for the Bolsheviks, as well as a skilful creator of contacts. 
With his linguistic capabilities, Nuorteva was able to move without any 
great difficulty in international circles. On the other hand the fear of 
Communism that prevailed in the West easily gave rise to exaggerated 
opinions about the danger of a man like Nuorteva. The improvement 
of trade relations could still be seen as an attempt to implant Commu- 
nist beliefs in the world outside Soviet Russia. It certainly seems to have 
been the case that among Nuorteva's duties was that of maintaining 
- 
contacts with left-wing groups in different countries; this is indicated by 
his work for the Comintern. 
In Soviet Russia Nuorteva was given a post in the Commissariat for 
Foreign Affairs. He became the head of a section whose primary con- 
cern was the Anglo-Saxon countries. With the limited material avail- 
able, it has not been possible to make a close study of his work there. 
Nevertheless it is clear that Nuorteva enjoyed the respect of Western 
diplomats stationed in Moscow. On the other hand, his radical reputa- 
tion haunted him abroad, as evidenced by the unsuccessful attempts to 
send him to Canada and Norway on commercial (and political?) mis- 
sions. In the autumn of 1924 Nuorteva was sent to Stockholm to be 
head of the local branch of the Soviet Information Bureau, Rosta. He 
nevertheless had to be recalled immediately to Moscow at the request of 
the Swedish Government, for the Swedes strongly suspected that Nuor- 
teva had gotten involved in the country's internal affairs and that he 
had in particular been in touch with the local Communists. 
Once it appeared that no suitable tasks could be found for Nuorteva 
in Moscow, he was transferred to Soviet Karelia. There he worked as a 
commissar for educational work and in quite important parts of the ad- 
ministration. Before his death he occupied for several years the highest 
post in Soviet Karelia: he was chairman of the executive committee, in 
other words, president of Soviet Karelia. 
Santeri Nuorteva's restless and eventful life came to a close in 1929. It 
is a matter of sheer guesswork as to whether Nuorteva, who had known 
Lenin since the year 190'1 when he helped him on his flight abroad 
through Finland, would have become a successful politician of the ilk of 
Otto Wille Kuusinen. He might, on the other hand, have been purged 
during the period of the Stalinist oppression in the 30's, a fate that did 
indeed befall many other Finns who had moved to the Soviet Union. 
Doubts about Nuorteva's political position were frequently expressed 
during his lifetime - even in Finland he had engaged in controversy 
with Kuusinen about the legitimacy of reformism. In the United States, 
radicals had criticised him for supporting nthe bourgeois working-class 
movementcc (i.e, the AFofL,). When Nuorteva was arrested in Soviet 
Russia in the spring of 1921 and kept in prison for about ten months, 
speculation arose in the West that he had fallen into disfavour precisely 
as a consequence of ideological errors. A more detailed study of this 
aspect of his career - as with many other of the vicissitudes of his life - 
would seem to be possible only when the archives of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union are opened to researchers. 
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